Supplemental Environmental Projects: DOJs March 2020 Policy showed the Downfalls of a Ban by McKernan, Madeline
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review 
Volume 5 Issue 1 Article 10 
Supplemental Environmental Projects: DOJs March 2020 Policy 
showed the Downfalls of a Ban 
Madeline McKernan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Madeline McKernan, Supplemental Environmental Projects: DOJs March 2020 Policy showed the 
Downfalls of a Ban, 5 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 94 (). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol5/iss1/10 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
 
Supplemental Environmental 
Projects: DOJs March 2020 Policy 
showed the Downfalls of a Ban 
Madeline McKernan* 
ABSTRACT 
In March of 2020, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) adopted a policy that bars the 
use of supplemental environmental projects (“SEPs”) in settlements of environmen-
tal enforcement suits. A ban on SEPs can drastically impact both companies and the 
environment. The DOJ repeatedly rolled back the use of SEPs during the Trump 
Administration, but President Biden reversed the ban placed on SEPs in March 2020 
under the previous administration. SEPs have long been used in environmental en-
forcement suits and have been extremely useful in the settlement process by giving 
companies more options when entering into settlement agreements, making settle-
ments easier for both sides. The DOJ explained the rationale for this ban as a Con-
stitutional issue, but this claim is unfounded. Over the years, the claim has been that 
SEPs were in violation of the Miscellaneous Receipts Act because Congress has not 
explicitly authorized SEPs, but Congress has gone as far as encouraging the use of 
them but has yet to pass a low regarding the use of SEPs. This means that with every 
change in administration, there could come a change in the policy regarding SEPs. 
This article explores the rationale behind this Constitutional issue, and why such a 
claim is unfounded. It also explores the detrimental impacts another ban could have 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced on March 12, 2020 that supple-
mental environmental projects (“SEPs”) will no longer be used as a settlement tool 
for environmental enforcement actions brought by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”).1 Then, on February 5, 2021, the Biden administration reversed 
the policy undoing the ban on SEPs.23 A SEP is a project intended to benefit the 
environment and is often included in settlement agreements after a company has 
violated environmental law.4 SEPs are not required, but are voluntarily undertaken 
and developed by the defendant corporation.5 Corporations favor the use of SEPs 
because they can reduce the amount they pay in civil penalty.6 A company will 
propose an SEP to be included in the settlement agreement, and the EPA can ap-
prove or deny the project proposal.7  Without SEPs there will be a detrimental im-
pact on company negotiations and the environment when trying to settle environ-
mental wrongdoings. 
SEPs have been used as a settlement tool in environmental enforcement actions 
as early as the 1980s.8 Throughout the Trump administration, the DOJ has rolled 
back their policy on the use of SEPs.9 Culminating on March 12, 2020 when the 
Department of Justice’s Environment and Natural Resources Division (“ENRD”) 
Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey Bossert Clark, issued a memorandum stating 
that provisions in settlements agreements including an SEP should not be used mov-
ing forward.10 The EPA has justified the use of SEPs by stating that “SEPs do not 
trade penalties for projects because there is no penalty owed to the government until 
the settlement is finalized.”11 The ENRD believed that this rationale does not justify 
the use of SEPs under the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, and the EPA has not pro-
vided good rationale to justify the continuance of SEPs in the future.12 The broad 
policy created in this memorandum does not allow for the EPA to amend their SEP 
 
 1. No More SEPs: New DOJ Policy May Mean Higher Penalties and More Complicated Negotia-
tions in Environmental Cases, VINSON & ELKINS (April 3, 2020), https://www.velaw.com/insights/no-
more-SEPs-new-doj-policy-may-mean-higher-penalties-and-more-complicated-negotiations-in-envi-
ronmental-cases/ [hereinafter No More SEPs]. 
 2. Memorandum from Jean E. Williams, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE: ENV’T AND NATR’L. RES. DIVISION 
(Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/enrd/page/file/1364716/download [hereinafter Memorandum 
from Jean E. Williams]. 
 3. See generally Steven Bonorris et al., Environmental Enforcement in Fifty States: The Promise and 
Pitfalls of Supplemental Environmental Projects, 11 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Env. L. & Pol’y 185, 203 
(2005) (describing the benefits of SEP use). 
 4. Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/supplemental-environmental-projects-SEPs (last visited March 12, 
2021). 
 5. Id. 
 6. No More SEPs, supra note 1. 
 7. Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs), supra note 4. 
 8. Stephen Lee, Justice Department Ends Use of Environmental Settlements Tools, BLOOMBERG 
LAW (March 13, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/justice-department-
ends-use-of-environmental-settlements-tool. 
 9.  
 10. Memorandum from Jeffrey Bossert Clark, ENRD Assistant Attorney General to ENRD Deputy 
Assistant Attorney Generals and Section Chiefs, U.S. Department of Justice Environment and Natural 
Resources Division 1-2 (March 12, 2020) (on file with the DOJ) [hereinafter Memorandum from Jeffrey 
Bossert Clark]. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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policy in order to come into compliance with the new guidelines set forth by the 
DOJ because the memorandum rejects the very basis on which the EPA supports 
SEPs.13 This decision had consequences for companies who could no longer imple-
ment these improvement projects as part of their settlement agreements, as well as 
the environment itself, which benefited from such projects.14 Future policies similar 
to this Trump-era policy would be detrimental to the environment.15 
In the past, many notable companies, such as BP and Volkswagen, have taken 
advantage of SEPs in settling their environmental enforcement actions.16 However, 
SEPs have also been subject to criticism over the years, often times involving the 
location where the SEP is taking place or the inadequacy of the penalty given out 
to the corporation.17 Supporters of SEPs believe that the use of SEPs in settlements 
are a more beneficial allocation of funds than placing the money with the U.S. 
Treasury because SEPs are intended to make amends for environmental harm 
caused by companies.18 
This article explores the impact on the environment and corporations caused 
by the Trump administration’s decision to end the use of SEPs in environmental 
enforcement suits. It serves as a cautionary tale for any future considerations to ban 
SEPs. Ending the use of SEPs in enforcement suits for environmental violations is 
not only bad for the environment, but also for businesses wanting to use SEPs in 
settlement negotiations. Part II of this article examines background information 
about SEPs and talks about notable examples of SEPs and the controversies sur-
rounding SEPs. Part III examines how the DOJ and the EPA have treated SEPs, 
which led to the eventual rollback on SEPS and why this decision to end the use of 
SEPs should not be repeated by another administration in the future. Part IV exam-
ines how the environment and corporations are impacted from ending the use of 
SEPs in settlement negotiations for environmental enforcement actions. Part V 
looks at current litigation and its potential impact on the future of the recent policy 
change banning SEPs. 
II. BACKGROUND ON SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS 
A. Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects 
SEPs have been used by the EPA and corporations to settle environmental en-
forcement suits for nearly thirty years.19 SEPs are not required by law,20 but 
 
 13. John C. Cruden, et al., So Long to SEPs, NAT’L LAW REV. (March 16, 2020), https://www.natlaw-
review.com/article/so-long-to-SEPs. 
 14. See generally Bonorris, et al., supra note 3, at 203 (describing the benefits of SEP use). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See generally, Eric Schaeffer & Kira Burkhart, House Bill Bans Future VW-Style Settlements 
ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT 1, 3 (June 1, 2017), https://www.environmentalintegrity.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/06/Environmental-Settlements-Report.pdf. 
 17. Lee, supra note 8; see also United States v. Antofina Chems., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15137* 
(E.D. Penn Aug. 5, 2002); United States v. Global Partners LP, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 218292 (D. Me. 
Dec. 19, 2019). 
 18. Cruden, et al., supra note 12. 
 19. See Lee, supra note 8. 
 20. Hana Vizcarra & Laura Bloomer, DOJ Phases Out Supplemental Environmental Projects in En-
vironmental Enforcement, HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL & ENERGY LAW PROGRAM (Aug. 6, 2020), 
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companies often want to complete community or environmental development pro-
jects in order to settle their claims of environmental infractions.21 These projects 
can be completed by companies in exchange for a lessened civil penalty.22 Many 
companies have taken advantage of SEPs in settlements for environmental enforce-
ment suits.23 The 2010 explosion of BP’s Deep Water Horizon rig and correspond-
ing oil spill caused significant environmental damage in the Gulf of Mexico when 
200 million gallons of oil flowed into the Gulf of Mexico over a span of about three 
months.24 In 2012, the lawsuit involving BP ended with a settlement agreement re-
quiring them to pay $350 million to help restore the Gulf shore and minimize im-
pacts of future oil spills as an SEP that was included in the settlement agreement.25 
The reason BP engaged in so much shore clean up after the oil spill was a result of 
an SEP included in the settlement.26 
In June of 2016, Volkswagen entered into a settlement agreement following an 
action brought against them for violating the Clean Air Act after the company 
knowingly installed defeat  devices on about 600,000 diesel powered vehicles.27 A 
defeat device is a device installed in the engine of a car that allows the engines to 
be programmed to meet emission standards during the testing phase, but when the 
car is driving normally, the devices shut off, so the cars no longer meet emission 
standards.28 In order to offset the environmental damage, a SEP required 
Volkswagen to invest $4.7 billion in green vehicle technology  in addition to the 
$10.03 billion paid to compensate consumers for the buyback program for the af-
fected vehicles.29 
Another environmental enforcement suit including a SEP in the settlement 
agreement occurred when Tyson Food violated the Clean Air Act back in 2006.30 
The EPA found that Tyson failed to comply with chemical accident prevention pro-




 21. Tatiana Schlossberg & Hiroko Tabuchi, Settlements for Company Sins Can No Longer Aid Other 
Projects, Sessions Says, N. Y. TIMES June 10, 2017, at A1 
 22. Francis X. Lyons, DOJ Policy Review of SEPs May Have Big Implications for Company Environ-
mental Settlements, NAT’L LAW REV. (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/doj-policy-
review-SEPs-may-have-big-implications-company-environmental-settlements. 
 23. See e.g. Campbell Robertson, et al., $18.7 Billion Deal with NP in Gulf Oil Spill, N. Y. TIMES July 
3, 2015, at A1, B7; Volkswagen to Spend up to $14.7 Billion to Settle Allegation of Cheating Emissions 
Tests and Deceiving Customers on 2.1 Liter Diesel Vehicles, FED TRADE COMM’N (June 28, 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/06/volkswagen-spend-147-billion-settle-allega-
tions-cheating [hereinafter Volkswagen to Spend $14.7 Billion]; Tyson Foods, Inc. Clean Air Act (CAA) 
Settlement, U.S. ENTVL. PROT. AGENCY (April 5, 2013), https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/tyson-foods-
inc. 
 24. Campbell Robertson, et al., supra note 21. 
 25. Schaeffer & Burkhart, supra note 14, at 3. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1. 
 28. Richard Epstein, The Role of Defeat Devices in Environmental Protection: Beyond the VW Scan-
dal, FORBES (Sept. 27, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardepstein/2017/09/27/the-role-of-de-
feat-devices-in-environmental-protection-beyond-the-vw-scandal/?sh=20841bb252c1. 
 29. Volkswagen to Spend $14.7 Billion, supra note 21. 
 30. Tyson Foods, Inc. Clean Air Act (CAA) Settlement, supra note 21. 
 31. Tyson Foods and Ammonia, ENTVL. NEWS NETWORK (April 8, 2013), https://www.enn.com/arti-
cles/45831-tyson-foods-and-ammonia. 
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Ammonia32 into the air at facilities in Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, and Nebraska that 
resulted in injuries, property damage, and one death, Tyson’s settlement agreement 
with the EPA included a civil penalty of $3.95 million and a SEP.33 The SEP re-
quired Tyson to put at least $300,000 toward the purchase of anhydrous ammonia 
emergency response equipment for fire departments in eight communities where 
Tyson operated.34 
The EPA is in charge of bringing civil administrative actions against companies 
without intervention from the courts.35 The EPA reports cases to the DOJ if they 
want to enforce civil judicial penalties or criminal sanctions against the company.36 
In some situations, the EPA is required to report cases to the DOJ.37 Even when not 
required, the EPA will often report cases to the DOJ on their own.38 The EPA does 
this because when the court approves a settlement agreement; it becomes a consent 
decree that is enforceable by a motion to the court.39 Civil judicial actions are filed 
against companies that failed to meet the statutory or regulatory requirements, failed 
to comply with an administrative order, or did not pay the EPA costs for cleanup.40 
A company wanting to use a SEP in their settlement has the task of submitting their 
SEP to the EPA and the EPA has the right to reject it.41 When determining whether 
an SEP is appropriate to be included in a settlement, the SEP must have an adequate 
nexus to the violation of the company, cannot duplicate remedies, and should use 
community input in determining the project.42 
Congress never explicitly authorized the EPA’s use of SEPs in environmental 
enforcement suits, but because Congress did authorize the EPA to enforce federal 
environmental statutes, the EPA saw itself as implicitly authorized to implement 
the use of SEPs in civil enforcement actions.43 In 1984, the EPA issued its first 
policy regarding SEPs, which have been used as a settlement tool in environmental 
enforcement actions ever since.44 The 1984 policy, they had not yet defined SEPs 
and referred to them as alternative payment projects that are beneficial to the envi-
ronment in their policy on civil penalties.45 Notably, Congress has never 
 
 32. Settlement with Tyson Foods to Address Multiple Releases of Anhydrous Ammonia, U.S. ENTVL. 
PROT. AGENCY (April 5, 2013), https://archive.epa.gov/epapages/newsroom_archive/news-
releases/bcca021f79474f0885257b44004dee6d.html (Anhydrous ammonia it a poisonous gas that is 
commonly used in industrial refrigeration systems.). 
 33. Tyson Foods, Inc. Clean Air Act (CAA) Settlement, supra note 21; Settlement with Tyson Foods to 
Address Multiple Releases of Anhydrous Ammonia, supra note 30. 
 34. Tyson Foods, Inc. Clean Air Act (CAA) Settlement, supra note 21; Settlement with Tyson Foods to 
Address Multiple Releases of Anhydrous Ammonia, supra note 30. 
 35. See No More SEPs, supra note 1. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See Justice Manual Title 1-21.100(a). 
 39. See Justice Manual Title 1-21.100(a). 
 40. Basic Information on enforcement, U.S. ENTVL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/en-
forcement/basic-information-enforcement#:~:text=Enforcing%20environmen-
tal%20laws%20is%20a,against%20violators%20of%20environmental%20laws (last updated Jan. 13, 
2021). 
 41. Id. 
 42. United States v. Atofina Chems., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15137, *15-16 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
 43. Bonorris, et al., supra note 3, at 197. 
 44. Caleb J. Holmes & Bernadette M. Rappold, New lawsuit Challenges DOJ Policy Prohibiting 
SEPs, NAT’L LAW REV. (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-lawsuit-chal-
lenges-doj-policy-prohibiting-SEPs. 
 45. Policy on Civil Penalties, U.S. ENTVL. PROT. AGENCY 24-25 (Feb. 16, 1984), https://19janu-
ary2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/epapolicy-civilpenalties021684.pdf. 
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disapproved of using SEPs as a settlement tool in environmental enforcement 
suits.46 In a 2018 statute, called America’s Water Quality Infrastructure Project, 
Congress even directed the EPA to promote Green Infrastructure projects, which 
are sometimes included in SEPs.47 In 1998, the EPA implemented a policy regard-
ing the use of SEPs in environmental enforcement actions which was later updated 
in March of 2015.48 
B. Controversies Surrounding the Use of Supplemental En-
vironmental Projects 
SEPs are considered controversial when implemented in environmental en-
forcement suits.49 A recent example of this is a 2019 suit against Global Partner LP 
(“Global Partners”) for violating the Clean Air Act by not obtaining the required 
licenses for volatile organic compounds (“VOC”) amongst other infractions.50 
Global Partners ultimately entered into a consent decree, the term for a settlement 
agreement in judicial actions,51 that required Global Partners to put at least $150,000 
into an SEP to improve the local air quality, as well as pay a $40,000 civil penalty.52 
The settlement agreement was controversial because the public thought that a 
$40,000 penalty was inadequate compared to the pollution caused.53 Critics thought 
that such a penalty would not deter companies from committing future environmen-
tal violations and the SEP did not address Global Partner’s actual emissions viola-
tion.54 The court ultimately granted the motion to enter the consent decree and in-
dicated  SEPs were  not intended to address the emission violation of Global Part-
ners but to go beyond what could be legally required for the company to return to 
compliance, thus the consent decree was consistent with the objectives of the Clean 
Air Act.55 
Another example of a controversial SEP is the 2002 case of United States v. 
Atofina Chemicals.56 Atofina Chemicals (“Atofina”) violated environmental pro-
tection laws when it failed to comply with statutes and regulations at multiple chem-
ical processing facilities.57 The EPA and Atofina entered into a settlement agree-
ment requiring Atofina to pay a reduced civil penalty of $1.9 million because 
Atofina agreed to perform an SEP in Mobile, Alabama at the cost of $300,000.58 
None of the plants that committed  environmental wrongdoings were located in 
 
 46. Joel Mintz, Abolition of Supplemental Environmental Projects: A Damaging Retreat for Environ-
mental Enforcement, THE CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Sept. 16, 2019), http://progressivere-
form.org/cpr-blog/abolition-of-supplemental-environmental-projects-a-damaging-retreat-for-environ-
mental-enforcement/. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs), supra note 4. 
 49. Lee, supra note 8. 
 50. United States v. Global Partners LP, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 218292, *2-3 (D. Me. Dec. 19, 2019). 
 51. Basic Information on Enforcement, supra note 37. 
 52. Global Partners LP, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 218292 at *5-6. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Global Partners LP, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 218292 at *7. 
 55. Id. at *20-21. 
 56. Antofina Chems., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15137 (E.D. Penn Aug. 5, 2002). 
 57. Id. at *2-6. 
 58. Id. at *7. 
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Mobile, Alabama.59 Since SEPs require community input,60 the proposed consent 
decree was published for public comment.61 During the comment period, a nonparty 
community group objected to the SEP because no projects would be performed in 
their community, which was impacted by Atofina’s wrongdoing.62 The court held 
that despite not receiving community input for project design, the consent decree 
should be entered because it was fair, adequate, and reasonable to resolve the action 
and the consent decree served the public interest.63 
In these two cases, the court allowed the companies to pay a reduced civil pen-
alty in exchange for their commitment to perform an SEP.64 Both courts determined 
that the settlement agreements including SEPs were fair, adequate, and reasona-
ble.65 This conclusion by the court in both cases supports the idea that SEPs serve 
some sort of public interest because of their impact on the environment. 
C. Supplemental Environmental Projects are Notable for 
their Positive Impacts 
SEPs were still being used in settlement agreements until the March 2020 ban, 
despite the controversies surrounding SEPs.66 Support for SEPs is widespread 
throughout the country, and, as of 2005, 30 out of the 50 states have now enacted 
their own SEP policies at the state level.67 SEPs are seen as mutually beneficial 
when they are implemented correctly, because the citizen or government plaintiff 
receives the benefits of restoration and prevention, while the defendant company 
pays a lower penalty.68 Also, the environment itself benefits because this money is 
guaranteed to go toward improving the environment.69 SEPs are a preferrable alter-
native to the traditional model of deterrence because they encourage self-reporting 
of violations, involve the impacted community in remedying the violation, and cre-
ate solutions to environmental problems.70 Due to this, SEPs are popular with envi-
ronmental groups, community organizations, and defendants.71 
 
 59. Id. at *2-6. 
 60. Id. at *15-16. 
 61. Id. at *1. 
 62. Id. at *8-9. 
 63. Id. at *20. 
 64. See id. at *20; Global Partners LP, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 218292 at *5-6. 
 65. Antofina Chems., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15137 at *20; Global Partners LP, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
218292 at *22. 
 66. See e.g. Campbell Robertson, et al., supra note 21; Volkswagen to Spend $14.7 Billion, supra note 
21; Tyson Foods, Inc. Clean Air Act (CAA) Settlement, supra note 21. 
 67. Bonorris, et al., supra note 3, at 188. 
 68. Kenneth T. Kristl, Making a Good Idea Even Better: Rethinking the Limits on Supplemental En-
vironmental Projects, 31 VT. L. REV. 217, 218 (2017). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Bonorris, et al., supra note 3, at 187. The traditional model has regulators imposing monetary 
penalties on violators. 
 71. Thomas O. McGarity, Remedies in Complex Litigation: Supplemental Environmental Projects in 
Complex Environmental Litigation, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1413 (June 2020). 
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III. DOJ AND EPA TREATMENT OF SEPS 
Under the Trump administration, the DOJ slowly rolled back the use of SEPs 
starting in  2017.72 The DOJ opposed the use of SEPs in settling environmental 
enforcement cases.73 In 2017 and 2018, a memoranda was released by the U.S. At-
torney General banning the use of SEPs that required payment to non-governmental 
or third-party organizations.74 The November 2018 memorandum generally prohib-
ited the use of  consent decrees that allowed for different relief than could be re-
ceived through enforcement by agencies or litigation ending in a judgment.75 The 
November 2018 memorandum changed the policy regarding the use of SEPs in con-
sent decrees and settlement agreements when it involved state and local govern-
ments.76 The DOJ indicated that SEPs should not be used in order to further policy 
goals of granting alternative relief.77 Then, in 2019, the policy was expanded, and a 
new memorandum was issued prohibiting SEPs in settlements at the federal level 
when cases involved state and local governments.78 
On March 12, 2020, ENRD Assistant Attorney General Clark released a mem-
orandum creating a new policy prohibiting the use of SEPs in civil judicial settle-
ments with the exception of diesel emissions reduction projects in conjunction with 
violations of the Clean Air Act.79 The memorandum stated that “Civil penalties are 
money for the government within the meaning of the Miscellaneous Receipts 
Act.”80 The Miscellaneous Receipts Act is important to the discussion of SEPs be-
cause it provides that a government official who receives money for the U.S. Gov-
ernment must  deposit it into the Treasury without any deductions.81 The 2020 mem-
orandum further provides that “attempts in consent decrees and settlement agree-
ments to divert cash from the Treasury to third parties have long been deemed im-
proper and inconsistent with the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, absent authorization 
from Congress.”82 
The March 2020 memorandum barred the use of SEPs as a negotiation tool in 
settlements for EPA cases.83 The government argues that settlement agreements in-
volving the use of SEPs are a violation of the Miscellaneous Receipts Act because 
they divert money away from the U.S. Treasury to third parties and because civil 
penalties are intended to be “money for the Government.”84 The memorandum 
 
 72. No More SEPs, supra note 1 
 73. Mintz, supra note 41. 
 74. Sara Chamberlain & Tim Briscoe, DOJ curtails use of supplemental environmental projects in 
environmental settlements, THOMAS COBURN, LLP (October 24, 2019), https://www.thompsonco-
burn.com/insights/publications/item/2019-10-24/doj-curtails-use-of-supplemental-environmental-pro-
jects-in-environmental-settlements. 
 75. Mintz, supra note 41. 
 76. Gwendolyn Keyes Fleming, et al., Legal Challenges to Federal Ban on SEPs May Result in 
Change in Enforcement Policy, NAT’L LAW REV. (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/arti-
cle/legal-challenge-to-federal-ban-SEPs-may-result-change-enforcement-policy. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Chamberlain and Briscoe, supra note 71. 
 79. Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs), supra note 4. 
 80. Memorandum from Jeffrey Bossert Clark, supra note 9 at 1. 
 81. See Applicability of the Miscellaneous Receipts Act to an Arbitral Award of Legal Costs, 
JUSTICE.GOV 1 (March 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1078036/download. 
 82. Memorandum from Jeffrey Bossert Clark, supra note 9 at 1. 
 83. Id. at 18. 
 84. Id. at 1. 
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states that “SEPs remain legally suspect and are in serious tensions with important 
aspects of our constitutional tradition,” confirming the overall disapproval of this 
practice by the Trump administration85 
Despite claims to the contrary, SEPs do not violate the Miscellaneous Receipts 
Act because mitigation, which is the purpose of an SEP, is allowed under the Act.86 
The EPA requires that an SEP have an adequate nexus to the environmental viola-
tion so they do not run into problems involving violations of the Miscellaneous 
Receipts Act.87 The EPA stated in a 2002 memorandum that “an adequate nexus is 
important because it ensures that the Agency [EPA] complies with the SEP Policy 
and the requirements of the MRA [Miscellaneous Receipts Act].”88 The EPA has 
taken steps to ensure that the SEP policy does not run into issues with the Miscel-
laneous Receipts Act.89 The EPA does not have the discretion to accept an SEP in 
a settlement agreement without the nexus requirement being met.90 
In Sierra Club v. Electronic Controls Design, Sierra Club appealed the trial 
court’s refusal to enter a proposed consent decree after Electronic Controls Design 
(“Electronic Controls”) allegedly violated  the Clean Water Act.91 The United States 
objected to the proposed consent decree that required Electronic Controls to pay 
$45,000 to private environmental organizations to maintain water quality, and the 
trial court refused to enter the consent decree after determining that it was a civil 
penalty, and the Clean Water Act only allows civil penalties if they are paid to the 
U.S. Treasury.92 Importantly, in coming to this decision, the trial court recognized 
that Congress encourages the use of projects that put money directly to environ-
mental protection; this reinforces the idea that SEPs are a known and accepted prac-
tice in settlements for environmental wrongdoings.93 The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed this decision stating that this was not considered a civil penalty 
because the organization never admitted liability, nor was liability judicially estab-
lished for negotiation of the settlement agreement.94 This is significant because, 
when using SEPs, parties attempt to make certain that SEPs are never considered 
penalties, and therefore do not need to be given directly to the U.S. Treasury as 
required by the Miscellaneous Receipts Act.95 The best way to ensure that an SEP 
is not considered a penalty is to negotiate the settlement before there is finding of 
liability.96 Advocates for SEPs argue that because the money never actually reaches 
federal officials, it is not being diverted from the U.S. Treasury, and therefore, does 
not violate the Miscellaneous Receipts Act.97 
 
 85. Id. at 8. 
 86. Kristl, supra note 65, at 252. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Memorandum from Walker B. Smith, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY 2 (Oct. 31, 2002), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/SEPnexus-mem.pdf. 
 89. See generally id. 
 90. Id. at 2. 
 91. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Elec. Controls Design, 909 F.2d 1350, 1352 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 92. Id. at 1352. 
 93. Id. at 1353. 
 94. Id. at 1353, 1356. 
 95. Douglas Rubin, How Supplemental Environmental Projects Can and Should be Used to Advance 
Environmental Justice, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 179, 190 (2010). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Rachel Frazin, Feds sued over no longer allowing polluters to pay for environmental projects, 
THE HILL (Oct. 8, 2020, 6:05 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/520286-feds-sued-
over-no-longer-allowing-polluters-to-pay-for. 
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The Trump administration’s ban on SEPs was not the first time that a change 
in policy was attempted.98 In 2017 the House of Representatives passed the “Stop 
Settlement Slush Fund Act of 2017,” which would have barred SEPs in settlements 
for environmental enforcement actions.99 Had the Senate passed the bill, the ban on 
SEPs in settlement agreements would have been made permanent, leaving no room 
for future executives to change the policy.100 As a result, the ban on SEPs would 
have been more difficult to overturn in the future.101 Even though the bill ultimately 
did not pass in the Senate, the ban on SEPs was still a DOJ policy based on the June 
2017 memorandum and the following updates leading to the March 2020 memo-
randum.102 The March 2020 memorandum extended the ban and made it clear that 
the DOJ would no longer enforce settlement agreements involving the United States 
as a party that includes SEPs.103 The most recent memorandum issued by Jean E. 
Williams, ERND Deputy Assistant Attorney General, on February 4, 2021, rescinds 
the March 2020 Memorandum and reinstates the SEP policy used pre-Trump era.104 
Congress has the power to end this debate, if they once and for all authorize the use 
of SEPs by statute, ending any argument that SEPs are in violation of the Miscella-
neous Receipts Act.105 Congress has the ability to divert funds that were otherwise 
intended to go to the U.S. Treasury, but Congress has yet to put forth a statute au-
thorizing the use of SEPs.106 It does not seem like this will occur anytime soon.107 
IV. DOJ’S BAN ON SEPS IS HARMFUL TO BOTH COMPANIES AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
The decision by the federal government to end the use of SEPs impacts both 
the environment and the companies that wish to use SEPs in settling environmental 
enforcement actions.108 For many years, SEPs companies have supported SEPs, 
nongovernmental organizations, and the federal government because they have en-
vironmental benefits and simplify settlement negotiations.109 
 
 98. Goodlatte Bill to Halt Settlement Slush Funds Passes House, H.R. JUDICIARY COMM. (Oct. 24, 
2017), https://republicans-judiciary.house.gov/press-release/goodlatte-bill-halt-settlement-slush-funds-
passes-house/. 
 99. Id.; Schaeffer & Burkhart, supra note 14, at 2. 
 100. See Goodlatte Bill to Halt Settlement Slush Funds Passes House, supra note 95. 
 101. Schlossberg & Tabuchi, supra note 19. 
 102. See id. 
 103. Caleb J. Holmes, DOJ’s Attack on ‘Supplemental Environmental Projects’ Extends to Citizen 
Plaintiffs, NAT’L LAW REV. (July 16, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/doj-s-attack-supple-
mental-environmental-projects-extends-to-citizen-plaintiffs. 
 104. See Memorandum from Jean E. Williams, supra note 2 at 1-2. 
 105. Laurie J. Sands, DOJ Policy Invalidates Special Environmental Projects in Settlements but Private 
Parties May Have Other Options, RIKER DANZIG, https://riker.com/print/publications/doj-policy-inval-
idates-special-environmental-projects-in-settlements-but-private-parties-may-have-other-options (last 
updated December 2020). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Schaeffer & Burkhart, supra note 14, at 2. 
 108. See generally Bonorris, et al., supra note 3, at 203 (describing the benefits of SEP use). 
 109. Cruden, et al., supra note 12. 
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A. The ban on SEPs is harmful to companies and detri-
mental to the settlement process 
SEPs are a popular tool among companies and environmentalists.110 There are 
many reasons corporations are inclined to take advantage of SEPs when negotiating 
settlement in environmental enforcement suits.111 Companies prefer the use of SEPs 
because they benefit both the companies and the environment.112 One of the most 
obvious impacts of a ban on SEPs is that companies would face larger civil penalties 
for their environmental violations, and companies would like to avoid this in order 
to save money.113 This is because companies will no longer be allowed to reduce 
their civil penalties by including an SEP in their settlement agreement.114 SEPs al-
low companies to reduce their civil penalties by up to 80 percent.115 Settlements 
without SEPs can face higher civil penalties as well as increased costs for injunctive 
relief.116 
Another benefit for companies is that SEPs can sometimes result in profit for 
the company.117 In 2003, the EPA updated their policy to allow profitable SEPs as 
long as the SEP does not become profitable to the company before 5 years has 
passed, as long as projects are evaluated to determine that the benefits to the public 
health or the environment warrant allowing this.118 This could incentivize compa-
nies trying to use SEPs in environmental enforcement cases. 
Without SEPs, companies will have less flexibility when negotiating settle-
ments.119 SEPs allow companies to focus more on the settlement agreement rather 
than the potential civil penalties they will have to pay, often decreasing negotiation 
time and decreasing court costs.120 Generally, the EPA’s flexibility in negotiation is 
directly correlated to how favorably the EPA regarded a proposed SEP.121 By ban-
ning the use of SEPs, negotiations will ultimately take more time and end up costing 
more money.122 Additionally, companies will pay larger out-of-pocket costs due to 
 
 110. McGarity, supra note 68, at 1413. 
 111. Francis X. Lyons, Insight: Three Questions Companies Face About SEPs and Environmental En-
forcement, BLOOMBERG LAW (Nov. 21, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-
and-energy/insight-three-questions-companies-face-about-SEPs-and-environmental-enforcement. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See SEParating from Tradition: Justice Department Prohibits Use of Supplemental Environmen-
tal Projects to Resolve Civil Enforcement Actions and Eyes Additional Policy Change, AKIN GUMP 2 
(April 2, 2020), https://www.akingump.com/a/web/55sGwRCjWKQTZDehrPRhvU/cSEHh/environ-
ment-alert-separating-from-tradition-justice-department-prohibits-use-of-supplemental-environmental-
projects-to-resolve-civil-enforcement-actions-and-eyes-additional-policy-change.pdf. 
 114. No More SEPs, supra note 1. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.; David Markel, EPA Enforcement: A heightened emphasis on mitigation relief, ABA (March 
1, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publica-
tions/trends/2013-14/march-april-2014/epa_enforcement_heightened_emphasis_mitigation_relief/. In-
junctive relief for environmental enforcement actions requires companies to perform certain projects to 
come into compliance with environmental laws after a violation, which is different from performing an 
SEP. 
 117. See Bonorris, et al., supra note 3, at 194. 
 118. Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY 2-3 (Dec. 5, 2003), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-10/documents/seps-profitableprojectstab10.pdf. 
 119. See No More SEPs, supra note 1. 
 120. McGarity, supra note 68, at 1413. 
 121. Lyons, supra note 108. 
 122. Id. 
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higher civil penalties.123 The Memorandum promulgated by Attorney General Clark 
recognized that SEPs simplify settlement negotiations because corporations are 
more prone to agree on settlements when they believe it will generate goodwill with 
the public.124 This is another reason why SEPs are important to corporations when 
settling environmental enforcement suits. 
Another benefit for companies entering into SEPs during settlement agree-
ments is the positive publicity a company can receive.125 Companies can say that 
they are sponsoring projects that benefit the public and the environment.126 Compa-
nies favor including SEPs because they can publicize the required projects as a mit-
igation effort producing concrete environmental benefits.127 This helps repair the 
credibility of the company with the community, which is a better alternative to pay-
ing a civil penalty.128 In Attorney General Clark’s memorandum from March 2020, 
he acknowledges that SEPs create goodwill between corporations and the commu-
nities that were affected by the environmental wrongdoings because these SEPs 
benefit the impacted communities.129 Many companies prefer to include a SEP in 
the settlement agreement because it will help preserve a positive image in the com-
munity after environmental wrongdoing.130 
Not only can there be future negative implications to any drawback of SEPs by 
the DOJ, but there were also present negative implications of this updated policy as 
well. The policy is not retroactive, but it impacted negotiations in the mist of settling 
when the ban went into place, no matter how close they are to settling because the 
ban was effective immediately.131 Companies who were settling environmental 
cases when the ban went into effect could not include previously negotiated SEPs, 
so negotiators had to restart the negotiation process to create a new settlement agree-
ment.132 United States v. DTE Energy Corporation is an example of a settlement 
agreement where the parties were required to change the terms of the agreement 
after the new policy went into effect.133 
In August 2010, the United States filed a lawsuit on behalf of the EPA alleging 
that DTE Energy Corporation (“DTE”) violated the Clean Air Act because they 
failed to obtain the necessary permits before starting construction on a major mod-
ification to their coal-fired generating unit.134 After nearly 10 years of litigation, this 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Memorandum from Jeffrey Bossert Clark, supra note 9, at 16. 
 125. Joel Mintz, Citizen Suits, Environmental Settlements, and the Constitution: Part 1, THE CTR. FOR 
PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Sep. 14, 2020), https://progressivereform.org/cpr-blog/citizen-suits-environ-
mental-settlements-constitution-part-i/. 
 126. Id. 
 127. John Mizerak, DOJ Moves to Eliminate Supplemental Environmental Projects from Settlements, 
COVINGTON (March 31, 2020), https://www.insideenergyandenvironment.com/2020/03/doj-moves-to-
eliminate-supplemental-environmental-projects-from-settlements/. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Memorandum from Jeffrey Bossert Clark, supra note 9, at 16. 
 130. Mintz, supra note 41. 
 131. Cruden, et al., supra note 12. 
 132. Vizcarra & Bloomer, supra note 18. 
 133. Id. 
 134. United States v. DTE Energy Co., 711 F.3d 643, 746-49 (6th Cir. 2017) (Rogers, J., dissenting); 
Art Fraas et al., EPA’s New Source Review Program: Time for Reform?, 47 ELR 1026, 1028 (January 
2017) (“The Clean Air Act requires that, before a company can construct a new industrial facility or 
expand an existing facility in the United States, it must first go through the New Source Review permit-
ting process and obtain that, ensures that the new or expanded facility will employ up-to-date pollution 
control technology.”). 
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case was almost resolved when the parties entered into a consent decree. However, 
DTE was not able to proceed with the originally agreed upon settlement terms be-
cause the DOJ changed its policy on SEPs on March 12, 2020.135 The DOJ then 
refused to include the consent decree with the SEP agreed upon in the original set-
tlement agreement before the March 2020 ban went into effect.136 The consent de-
cree that the parties ultimately agreed on required DTE to pay a civil penalty and 
required DTE to reduce pollution at its coal-fired power plants as injunctive re-
lief.137 The $2 million community-based environmental project, originally included 
before the DOJ’s new policy was issued, was removed.138 
The failure to include a SEP in the final agreement caused  Sierra Club to in-
tervene and ask the court to enter a separate agreement requiring the aSEP that was 
agreed upon before the DOJ policy change.139 The Sierra Club was able to enter the 
suit as an intervenor as part of the citizen suit provision in the Clean Air Act.140 
Sierra Club filed a motion in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan to enter an agreement between Sierra Club and DTE that required DTE 
to commit to funding a $2 million community environmental project, and retire 
power plants, which were not included in the consent decree entered by the court.141 
This was similar to the original consent decree before the policy change regarding 
SEPs.142 The court rejected the motion stating that private settlement agreements 
should not be entered by the court.143 Ultimately, this meant that the court would 
not retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms and conditions of the settlement agree-
ment between DTE and Sierra Club requiring the SEP. Should DTE not comply, 
Sierra Club would have to file a new suit in the appropriate jurisdiction, Wayne 
County, Michigan, in order for a court to enforce the settlement agreement.144 
B. DOJ’s prohibition of SEPs disregards environmental 
protection in environmental enforcement suits 
The EPA uses SEPs in environmental enforcement actions because SEPs in-
crease support for projects aimed an environmental protection.145 One of the re-
quirements to determine if an SEP is fair, adequate, and reasonable in environmen-
tal enforcement suits is that they have an adequate nexus to the environmental vio-
lation of the company.146 Doing away with the use of SEPs by the DOJ is detri-
mental for the local communities in which the violations occurred  because it is less 
likely that those communities will receive any funding for environmental repair.147 
 
 135. See DTE Energy Co., 711 F.3d at 748 (Rogers, J., dissenting); Vizcarra & Bloomer, supra note 
18. 
 136. Vizcarra & Bloomer, supra note 18. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Holmes, supra note 100. 
 139. Mintz, supra note 123. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Motion in Support at 4, United States v. DTE Energy, No. 2:10-cv-13101-BAF-RSW. 
 142. See Vizcarra & Bloomer, supra note 18. 
 143. Motion to Enter Agreement at 2, United States v. DTE Energy, No. 2:10-cv-13101-BAF-RSW. 
 144. Motion in Support, supra note 138 at 8. 
 145. Bonorris, et al., supra note 3, at 203 (quoting Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Project 
Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 24, 796, 24, 797-98 (May 5, 1998)). 
 146. Antofina Chems., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15137 at *15-16 (E.D. Penn Aug. 5, 2002). 
 147. Vizcarra & Bloomer, supra note 18. 
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SEPs have been used to improve human health and the environment in communities 
impacted by violators.148  There is no guarantee that money going into the U.S. 
Treasury, as a civil penalty by corporations will be used to fund environmental pro-
tection projects.149 Ultimately, the DOJ policy requiring companies who have  com-
mitted environmental wrongdoing to pay funds to the U.S. Treasury will likely re-
sult in little, if any, relief for the communities that are directly affected.150 This is 
why SEPs are favored by communities where these environmental violations oc-
curred.151 Communities can actually see the corporations paying for the harm they 
have caused to the environment instead of the money going into the U.S. treasury 
where no real impact can be seen by the local communities.152 
SEP impact communities beyond what is required for compliance with envi-
ronmental regulations.153 Cases like Atofina Chemicals show that SEPs do not al-
ways help the communities impacted by environmental violations,154 but the 2020 
policy further decreases the likelihood that these communities will receive funding 
to fix the wrongdoings of these companies.155 Money placed in the U.S. Treasury 
could be used for other purposes, which would prevent the restoration of the envi-
ronment and ecosystems most affected.156 
Many SEPs promote pollution prevention—not just reduction of pollution—
which promotes a healthy environment through renewable energy and energy effi-
cient projects.157 The EPA encourages using SEPs to promote renewable energy and 
energy efficient projects because they can achieve environmental benefits that 
would not be attainable without an SEP.158 Kevin Minoli, former EPA acting gen-
eral counsel, said, “there’s a long history of SEPs making a meaningful difference 
in the environmental space.”159 SEPs often cause enduring impacts on the environ-
ment by creating long lasting environmentally beneficial technologies.160 These 
types of technological advances would not occur without SEPs due to lack of fund-
ing.161 The new DOJ policy erodes environmental protection efforts by not allowing 
for third-party payments to fund environmental protection.162 
The EPA’s data shows a sharp decline in the use of SEPs since the rollbacks 
began in 2017.163 The data seems to prove a causation between the decrease in SEPs 
in settlements and the rollbacks which began in 2017.  From 2014 to 2017, 348 
 
 148. Mintz, supra note 41. 
 149. Sands, supra note 102. 
 150. Mintz, supra note 41. 
 151. See Lyons, supra note 20. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id. 
 154. Antofina Chems., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15137 (E.D. Penn Aug. 5, 2002). 
 155. Vizcarra & Bloomer, supra note 18. 
 156. See Schlossberg & Tabuchi, supra note 19. 
 157. A Toolkit for States: Using Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) to Promote Energy Ef-
ficiency (EE) and Renewable Energy (RE), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY 1, 13, 15 (Jan. 2005), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/eere_sep_toolkit_final_2005-01-12.pdf 
[hereinafter A Toolkit for States]. 
 158. Id. at 13. 
 159. Lee, supra note 8. 
 160. A Toolkit for States, supra note 153, at 12-13. 
 161. Id. at 12. 
 162. See Schlossberg & Tabuchi, supra note 19. 
 163. See generally Enforcement and Compliance History Online: Enforcement Case Search Results, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://echo.epa.gov/facilities/enforcement-case-search/results (last 
visited March 11, 2021) (showing a reduction in the number of SEP projects in each state). 
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cases were settled using SEPs with corporations spending almost $130 million on 
environmental projects.164 From 2017 to September 2020, only 53 cases were set-
tled with SEPs with less than $52 million spent on environmental projects by cor-
porations.165 That is a decrease of 295 cases where corporations used SEPs as an 
environmental tool since the DOJ started to roll back the use of SEPs back in 2017. 
During the rollback on SEPs, a significant amount of money was diverted from 
projects intended to help the environment.166 This is a loss for the environment be-
cause funds previously used to help the environment may be spent on other pro-
jects.167 The decrease in money spent by companies on SEPs since the DOJ voiced 
its disapproval of SEPs can be seen from the data.168 
V. LOOKING FORWARD 
The President’s ability to change the SEP policy is concerning for many rea-
sons, primary among them is the possibility that a future ban on SEPs could have a 
detrimental impact on the environment.169 A four-year presidency can substantially 
impact the environment.170 When a president has to reinstate old policies, including 
SEPs, it could take two to four years before such a policy is completely repaired.171 
President Biden came into office declaring that the environment was one of his top 
priorities.172 
The policy change by the DOJ involving the use of SEPs quickly faced oppo-
sition in both the environmental and legal community. On Oct. 8, 2020, the Con-
servation Law Foundation (“CLF”) filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts, Conservation Law Foundation v. William Barr et. 
al.173 The complaint challenged the policy barring the DOJ from using SEPs as a 
settlement tool in enforcement actions because of the real-world benefits achieved 
through their use.174 The CLF challenged the policy as being unlawful.175 The com-
plaint alleged that SEPs are not in violation of the Miscellaneous Receipts Act be-
cause the Office of Legal Counsel has consistently said that: 
Settlements do not violate the Miscellaneous Receipts Act so long as: (1) the 
settlement is executed before an admission or finding of liability in favor of the 
United States; and (2) the United States does not retain post-settlement control over 
the deposition or management of the funds or any projects carried out under the 
settlement, except for ensuring that the parties comply with the settlement.176 
The CLF argued that SEPs are “entirely independent from monies paid to the 
Unites States Treasury, such as civil penalties,” and “SEPs are independent from 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Mintz, supra note 41. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See id. 
 169. Bonorris, et al., supra note 3, at 203. 
 170. Carol Davenport, Restoring Environmental Rules Rolled Back by Trump Could Take Years, 
N.Y.TIMES Jan. 23, 2021, at A18. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Juliet Eliperin, et al., Biden’s Policis on Climate Change, THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 22, 
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/biden-climate-environment/. 
 173. Conservation Law Foundation v. Barr, No. 1:20-cv-11827 (D. Mass. dismissed Feb. 5, 2021). 
 174. Complaint 2-3, Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. Barr, No. 1:20-cv-11827. 
 175. Id. at 1. 
 176. Id. at 11. 
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monies already appropriated from the United States Treasury.”177 The CLF volun-
tary dismissed this case on February 5, 2021 after the Clark Memo was withdrawn. 
178 CLF v. Barr shows that any future SEP policy withdrawal will be met with liti-
gation because environmental groups see it is an integral part of settlement agree-
ments for environmental wrongdoings.179 
On January 20, 2021, the Biden Administration took over with a commitment 
to restore environmental justice.180 An executive order, issued the same day that 
President Biden was sworn into office, requested the heads of all agencies conduct 
an immediate review of all existing regulations, orders, guidance, documents, poli-
cies, and any other similar agency actions promulgated, issued or adopted between 
January 20, 2017, and January 20, 2020.181 Based on this executive order, on Feb-
ruary 4, 2021, the ERND Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Jean E. Williams, 
issued a memorandum withdrawing the August 2019 and March 2020 policies re-
garding SEPs.182 This policy change was made effective immediately.183 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A ban on the use of SEPs in environmental enforcement actions is detrimental 
to both companies and the environment. SEPs are valuable settlement tools for en-
vironmental enforcement actions and are a good way to ensure that companies who 
commit environmental wrongs undertake a project to remedy any damage they 
caused to the environment.184 Therefore, it benefits all parties involved to take ad-
vantage of SEPs as a settlement tool. 185 SEPs promotes public health and environ-
mental protection efforts,186 which are the core principles of the EPAs mission.187 
Banning SEPs also causes worry for the future of the environment because, 
without companies paying for SEPs, it is unclear if money paid to the U.S. Treasury 
as civil penalties in environmental enforcement actions will ever reach communities 
directly harmed by companies who failed to follow environmental regulations.188 It 
is likely that less money will be put into environmental protection efforts.189 As 
discussed above, companies lose a valuable settlement tool when they are not al-
lowed to be implemented in settlement agreements.190 
 
 177. Id. at 13-14. 
 178. Conservation Law Foundation v. Barr, No. 1:20-cv-11827 (D. Mass. dismissed Feb. 5, 2021). 
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Climate change and environmental action tend to be a highly partisan issues,191 
so, as presidents change, environmental policies like the SEP policy could 
change.192 It is up to Congress to stop the debate about the lawfulness of the use of 
SEPs.193 If Congress showed its approval of SEPs and made the EPA’s ability to 
use SEPs in settlement agreements a law, it would resolve the regulatory uncer-
tainty, and leave little question about their legitimacy.194 
 
 
 191. Nadja Popovich, Climate Change Rises as a Public Priority. But It’s More Partisan Than Ever, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/20/climate/climate-change-
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 192. See Schlossberg & Tabuchi, supra note 19. 
 193. See Sands, supra note 102. 
 194. See Nicholas William Targ & Chelsea Maclean, The Implications of an IRS Decision on Supple-
mental Environmental Projects, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (4th Qtr. 2007), https://www.hklaw.com/en/in-
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